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Abstract
This paper develops a general-equilibrium model of skill-biased technological
change that approximates the observed shifts in the shares of wage and non-wage
income going to the top decile of U.S. households since 1980. Under realistic
assumptions, we nd that all agents can benet from the technology change,
provided that the observed rise in redistributive transfers over this period is
taken into account. We show that the increase in capitals share of total income
and the presence of capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity are two key
features that help support the wages of ordinary workers as the new technology
di¤uses.
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1 Introduction
Income inequality in many industrial countries increased markedly over the past three
decades. Most of the increase can be traced to gains made by those near the top of
the income distribution. According to a recent study by the OECD (2011), the
highest 10% of earners have been leaving the middle earners behind more rapidly
than the lowest earners have been drifting away from the middle. The study as-
serts that technological progress and a more integrated global economy have brought
profound changes in the ways that rms produce and distribute goods and services,
and that these changes have shifted production technologies in favor of highly-skilled
individuals.
Rising inequality from top incomes is particularly evident in the U.S. economy.
Autor, et al. (2006) show that since the mid-1980s, upper tail U.S. wage dispersion
has increased signicantly while lower tail wage dispersion has actually declined.
The share of total pre-tax income including capital gains going to the top decile of
U.S. households rose from 35% in 1980 to around 48% in 2010 (Piketty and Saez
2003, updated). The increase in the top decile income share was driven by shifts
in both labor and capital incomes. Changes in capital gains and dividend income
were the two largest contributors to the increase in the Gini coe¢ cient from 1996
and 2006 according to a study by the Congressional Research Service (Hungerford
2011). Capitals share of total income in the U.S. economy increased from about 35%
in 1980 to around 41% in 2010. Given that the distribution of wealth in the U.S.
economy is highly skewed, the observed increase in capitals share of income would
be expected to disproportionately benet households near the top of the income
distribution.1 As a mitigating factor, transfer payments from the government and
businesses to individuals increased from 10% of GDP in 1980 to around 15% in 2010.
These transfers would be expected to disproportionately benet households outside
the top decile of the income distribution.
This paper examines the welfare consequences of a gradual shift in rmspro-
duction technologies that increases income inequality in a manner consistent with
U.S. experience over the past three decades. The framework of our analysis is a
general equilibrium model in which the top decile of households owns 100 percent of
the productive capital stock a setup that roughly approximates the highly skewed
1The top decile of U.S. households owns approximately 80 percent of nancial wealth and about
70 percent of total wealth including real estate. See Wol¤ (2006), Table 4.2, p. 113.
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distribution of U.S. nancial wealth.2 Unlike income inequality, the degree of wealth
inequality in the U.S. economy has remained relatively steady over time. The con-
sumption of the capital owners in the model is funded from wages and dividends
while the consumption of the remaining agents, called workers, is funded from wages
and redistributive government transfers. All agents supply labor endogenously to
rms. Capital owners are interpreted as entrepreneurs whose labor input exhibits
complementarity with the stock of physical capital. This e¤ect, which we label as
capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarityworks in much the same way as the
mechanism proposed by Krusell, et al. (2000), except that here the complementarity
e¤ect applies more narrowly to the labor supply of the top decile, as opposed to
the broader population of college-educated workers. An empirical study by Lemieux
(2006) provides support for our specication. Specically, he nds that wage inequal-
ity among college-educated workers has increased signicantly in recent decades. The
study concludes (p. 199) that changes in wage inequality are increasingly concen-
trated in the very top end of the wage distribution.
We show that the welfare e¤ects of rising inequality in the model depend crucially
on several features. These include: (1) the nature of capital owners expectations
(which a¤ects perceptions of permanent income and the resulting investment/saving
response), (2) the assumed paths for redistributive government transfers and capitals
share of total income, and (3) the degree of complementarity between physical capital
and entrepreneurial labor. Under realistic assumptions, we nd that all agents can
benet from the technology change, provided that the observed rise in redistributive
transfers over this period is taken into account. The increase in capitals share of total
income and the presence of capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity are two key
features that help support the wages of ordinary workers as the new technology
di¤uses.
We model skill-biased technological change as a di¤usion process that shifts the
parameters of the representative rms constant elasticity of substitution (CES) pro-
duction function in a way that approximates observed movements in the shares of
wage and non-wage income going to the top decile of U.S. households since 1980.
Specically, the share parameters for the three productive inputs (physical capital,
entrepreneurial labor, and ordinary worker labor) are allowed to evolve according to
2Similar concentrated capital ownership models have been applied recently to asset pricing. See,
for example, Danthine and Donaldsen (2008), Guvenen (2009), and Lansing (2011). Mankiw (2000)
examines the implications of such a model for scal policy.
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an S-shaped trajectory, consistent with empirical studies on the manner in which
new innovations are adopted over time (Comin, et al. 2008). We calibrate the law of
motion for the di¤usion process to approximately match the average U.S. adoption
rate for three important technology innovations, namely, personal computers, mo-
bile telephones, and internet use. Coincident with the technology di¤usion process,
we allow redistributive government transfers from the top decile to the remainder of
households to increase in a manner consistent with U.S. data.
Our approach to modeling skill-biased technological change is similar to the frame-
work of Goldin and Katz (2007) who allow CES production function share parameters
to shift over time as a way of capturing technology-induced changes in the demand
for skilled versus unskilled labor. According to Acemoglu and Autor (2012), shifts
in these parameters can also be interpreted as capturing skill-replacing technical
changesthat increase rmsdemand for one type of skill at the expense of another.3
The introduction of any new technology naturally involves considerable uncer-
tainty about its potential widespread use in the future. We therefore examine the
role of expectations in shaping the transition paths of the endogenous variables and
the resulting welfare e¤ects. We rst consider the case where capital owners have per-
fect foresight about the transition path.4 While this information assumption may be
viewed as extreme, it serves as a useful benchmark. Next, we examine the case where
capital owners employ myopic (or random walk) expectations. Specically, their fore-
casts for variables dated t+ 1 or later are given by the most recently observed value
of the same variable. Such a forecast rule can be viewed as boundedly-rational be-
cause it economizes on the costs of collecting and processing information. Finally, we
consider a formulation labeled learning in which the share of capital owners with
knowledge about the laws of motion governing the transition increases gradually over
time as the new technology is adopted.
The welfare outcomes for both types of agents are sensitive to the way that
expectations are formed. Capital owners always benet from the technology change
but the size of their welfare gains depend on their degree of foresight. Their optimal
investment response and the resulting path for their consumption depend crucially
on whether they foresee the permanent shift in their income. Workerswelfare may
3Along somewhat similar lines, Ríos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010) introduce redistribution
shocks which take the form of stochastic variation in the share parameters of a Cobb-Douglas
production function.
4Workers consume their wage income plus transfers each period, so they make no intertemporal
decision.
3
either rise or fall, depending on the magnitude of the capital owners investment
response which in turn inuences the equilibrium path of workerswages. Under
perfect foresight, welfare gains are highest for capital owners but workers su¤er a
welfare loss. In this case, capital owners immediately increase their consumption at
the expense of investment because they foresee the large increase in their permanent
income. The initial jump in their consumption yields a large welfare gain in excess
of 30% of per-period consumption for the baseline calibration. However, the resulting
slowdown in capital accumulation lowers the paths of workerswages and consumption
relative to the models no-change trend. As a result, workers su¤er a welfare loss of
1.3% of per-period consumption in the baseline model under perfect foresight.
In the case of myopic expectations, capital owners do not foresee the large increase
in their permanent income. Consequently, their consumption does not jump at the
beginning of the transition, but rather increases gradually along with their current
income. We view this scenario as more realistic than the perfect foresight regime.
Similarly, investment increases gradually relative to the no-change trend which boosts
capital accumulation and raises the paths of workerswages and consumption. At
the same time, redistributive government transfers are growing faster than GDP, as
observed in the data. For the baseline model, the welfare gain for capital owners
is about 9% of per-period consumption whereas workers now achieve a welfare gain
of about 1.5%. The welfare results for the learning regime fall in between those
for perfect foresight and myopic expectations. Similar to myopic expectations, the
learning mechanism precludes an immediate jump in capital owners consumption at
the beginning of the transition path. However, as more capital owners learn about
the process governing their future income, their consumption starts increasing faster,
eventually catching up to the perfect foresight trajectory. Under learning, capital
owners achieve a welfare gain of about 15% of per-period consumption whereas
workers achieve a welfare gain of about 0.6%.
As part of the analysis, we consider how di¤erent categories of income contribute
to the welfare e¤ects of the transition. When the ratio of redistributive government
transfers to GDP is held constant at the 1980 level of 10% (rather than increasing
to 15% as in the data), capital owners enjoy a welfare gain of 16% of per-period
consumption under myopic expectations versus a gain of 9% in the baseline scenario.
Workers now su¤er a small welfare loss of 0.15% versus a baseline gain of 1.5%. This
experiment highlights the importance of the rising trend of redistributive transfers
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in allowing workers to achieve a positive welfare gain in the baseline scenario. We
also consider an experiment where capitals share of total income is held constant
at its 1980 level while the share of wage income going to the top decile continues to
rise in a manner consistent with the data. Both types of agents are made worse-o¤
relative to the baseline scenario. Under myopic expectations, the capital owners
welfare gain is now only 1.1% versus a baseline gain of 9%. Workers su¤er a welfare
loss of 2.6% versus a baseline gain of 1.5%. Interestingly, both types of agents benet
from an increase in capitals share of total income even though capital ownership is
concentrated in the hands of the top decile. As discussed further below, this result is
due to the positive wage impacts of a technology-induced increase in the productivity
of physical capital. The positive wage impacts are stronger in the presence of capital-
entrepreneurial skill complementarity.
To gauge the inuence of capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity, we com-
pare the baseline model to one with a standard Cobb-Douglas production function.
In the Cobb-Douglas model, both types of labor exhibit the same (unitary) elasticity
of substitution with physical capital. The share parameters of the Cobb-Douglas
production function are assumed to shift over time in manner that matches the U.S.
income distribution data. We nd that both types of agents are considerably worse-
o¤ in the Cobb-Douglas world. For example, under myopic expectations, the capital
ownerswelfare gain is only 0.4% of per-period consumption versus a baseline gain of
9%. Workers now su¤er a large welfare loss if 12.5% versus a baseline gain of 1.5%.
The absence of capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity means that a technol-
ogy change which raises the productivity of physical capital now bestows less benets
on entrepreneurial labor, thus lowering the capital owners wage path relative to the
baseline model. The wage path of workers is also lowered, as dictated by the equilib-
rium conditions of the competitive labor market. Lower wage paths for both types
of agents bring about lower labor supplies, which in turn slows the growth rate of
aggregate output during the transition period. The upward shift in the top decile in-
come share still allows the capital owners consumption path to surpass the no-change
trend, but the gains are much smaller than in the baseline model. But the workers
consumption path now drops below the no-change trend, leading to a large welfare
loss. This experiment shows that capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity is an
important feature that not only benets the suppliers of entrepreneurial labor; it can
also deliver benets to ordinary workers.
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We also investigate the sensitivity of the welfare results to changes in the values
of other key parameters, including the elasticities of intertemporal substitution for
consumption and for labor supply, the subjective time discount factor, and the speed
of technology di¤usion. We show that each of these parameters can have a signicant
impact on welfare outcomes. Overall, we nd that the range of possible welfare
outcomes from skill-biased technological change is enormous, even in the relatively
simple framework considered here with only two types of agents. These ndings
suggest that conclusions regarding the appropriate policy response to rising income
equality can be strongly inuenced by the details of any particular model.
1.1 Related Literature
Much research has focused on the rising wage premium of skilled versus unskilled
workers as an important driver of rising U.S. income inequality. The literature em-
phasizes the impact of skill-biased technological change which disproportionately ben-
ets workers with a college education.5 Heathcote, et al. (2010, 2011) focus on the
welfare consequences of rising inequality that is driven by shifts in the relative wages
of groups with di¤erent education levels. In contrast, our analysis focuses on the wel-
fare consequences of rising inequality that is driven by gains in top incomes, i.e., the
highest 10% of earners. We also take into account observed shifts in the distribution
of both labor and capital incomes.
As an alternative to skill-biased technological change, Piketty, et al. (2011) argue
that the dramatic rise in top incomes has been driven mainly by institutional changes
which strengthened the bargaining power of top earners at the expense of lower
earners. According to this theory, the shift in bargaining power has enabled rent-
seeking top earners to successfully push their pay above their marginal product.
Along these lines, Kumhof and Ranciere (2011) consider a model where rising income
inequality (as measured by the income share of the top 5% of households) is driven
by a decline in the bargaining power of workers. However, in reduced form, the
workers loss of bargaining power can be interpreted as roughly equivalent to a shift
in the rms production technology. Their analysis focuses on the link between rising
inequality and a shock-induced nancial crisis. In contrast, our aim is to gauge the
5A partial list of research in this area includes: Katz and Autor (1999), Krusell, et al. (2000),
Acemoglu (2002), Agion (2002), Card and DiNardo (2002), Hornstein, et al. (2005), Goldin and
Katz (2007, 2008), and Acemoglu and Autor (2012). For a recent overview of the literature, see
Violante (2012).
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welfare consequences of the observed three-decade rise in the U.S. top decile income
share.
Our nding that all agents can achieve welfare gains in an economy with rising
income inequality compliments the results of Heathcote, et al. (2010, 2011). As in
our analysis, they obtain smaller welfare gains for agents who are myopic. This is
because myopic agents in their model fail to anticipate the future rise in the college
wage premium and thus do not invest in a college education. In our model, welfare
gains are smaller for myopic capital owners because they fail to anticipate the future
rise in their permanent income, and thus postpone consumption relative to the perfect
foresight trajectory. However, the capital ownersmyopia is actually benecial for
workers because it leads to faster capital accumulation which in turn boosts workers
wages and consumption.
In contrast to the structural model approach, empirical studies have mostly found
large welfare losses from rising income inequality (Attanasio and Davis 1996, Krueger
and Perri 2004). As a caveat, it must be noted that empirical data on shifts in relative
wages may not give an accurate picture of the quantities that matter for household
welfare, namely consumption and leisure. Krueger and Perri (2006) argue that the
impact of rising income inequality on consumption inequality was partially mitigated
by an increase in household borrowing to nance consumption at the lower end of
the income distribution. Recently, however, Aguiar and Bils (2011) and Attanasio,
et al. (2012) argue that consumption inequality, when properly measured, appears
to mirror income inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some styl-
ized facts about the increase in income inequality in the U.S. economy over the past
three decades. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 describes our calibration pro-
cedure. Section 5 presents our quantitative results. Section 6 concludes. An appendix
provides details on the model solution procedure and the welfare computation.
2 Stylized Facts
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the share of pre-tax income (including capital gains)
going to the top decile of U.S. households, as documented by Piketty and Saez (2003,
updated). The top decile income share rose from 35% in 1980 to around 48% in
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Figure 1: The top decile income share increased from 35% in 1980 to around 48% in
2010. The trend was driven by shifts in the distribution of income from wage and
non-wage sources. Capitals share of total income, as dened by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, increased from about 35% in 1980 to around 41% in 2010.
2010.6 Income from wage and non-wage sources both contributed to the rise, but
most of the trend is attributable to the rising share of wage income going to the
top decile. It is worth noting, however, that the category of wages includes income
derived from the exercise of employee stock options a component that blurs the
distinction between labor and capital incomes. Capitals share of total income, as
dened by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, increased from about 35% in 1980 to
around 41% in 2010.7
6Updated annual data through 2010 are available from Emmanuel Saezs website:
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/. The trends in this gure and others are constructed using the
Hodrick-Prescott lter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
7Capitals share is dened here as one minus labors share where labors share is obtained from
www.bls.gov/data using series ID PRS85006173. The tabulated series is indexed to 100 in 1992
which corresponds to a labor share of 63.2%. For additional details, see Gomme and Rupert (2004).
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Figure 2: Decomposition of top decile income share into wage and non-wage sources.
Non-wage sources of income for the top decile (roughly in order of importance) in-
clude: entrepreneurial income, capital gains, dividends, interest income, and rents.
Figure 2 shows the decomposition of the top decile income share into its com-
ponent parts. Non-wage sources of income for the top decile (roughly in order of
importance) include: entrepreneurial income, capital gains, dividends, interest in-
come, and rents.
Figure 3 plots transfer payments to individuals as a percentage of GDP from
1959 to 2010. These are payments from governments and businesses to individuals
or nonprot institutions serving individuals.8 Examples include benets from Old
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), Medicare and Medicaid benets,
Supplemental Security Income, Family Assistance, Food Stamps, and Unemployment
Insurance Compensation. The gure shows that the ratio of transfer payments to
GDP increased from 10% of GDP in 1980 to around 15% in 2010.
8Data on transfer payments and GDP are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis FRED data base. Payments from businesses accounted for only about 1% of to-
tal transfers in 2005. For a detailed description of the various transfer programs, see
http://www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/spi2005/06%20Personal%20Current%20Transfer%20Receipts.pdf
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Figure 3: Transfer payments from the government and businesses to individuals in-
creased from 10% of GDP in 1980 to around 15% of GDP in 2010.
While some of the run-up in transfer payments in recent years appears to have
been triggered by the governments response to the nancial crisis of 2007-2009, it is
also true that pre-tax income inequality, as measured by the top decile income share,
continued to trend upward over this period. More generally, it seems reasonable to
view the upward trend in transfer payments from 1980 to 2010 as a deliberate e¤ort
by the government to address the trend of rising pre-tax income inequality. In the
model, we make the simplifying assumption that transfer payments represent a pure
redistribution from the top decile to the remainder of households, accomplished via
a lump-sum tax on capital owners administered by the government. We investigate
the sensitivity of our results the assumed path for these transfers.
A basic assumption of our analysis is that the increase in U.S. pre-tax income in-
equality over the past three decades was driven by a slow moving technological change
that made production processes more capital intensive and raised the wages of highly-
skilled entrepreneurs in the top decile. As evidence of technological change, Figure
4 plots the U.S. adoption trajectories for three important technology innovations,
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Figure 4: The di¤usion path for information and communication technology in the
U.S. economy can be approximated by the law of motion t = t 1+t 1 (1  t 1) ;
with  = 0:25:
namely, personal computers, mobile cellular telephones, and internet use three se-
ries which measure the spread of information and communication technology (ICT).9
All three series exhibit an S-shaped trajectory a typical pattern for the manner in
which new innovations are adopted over time (Comin, et al. 2008). Comparing Fig-
ure 4 to Figure 1 shows that the spread of ICT in the U.S. economy follows roughly
the same trajectory as the rise in the top decile income share. While suggestive, this
comovement does not prove causation running from ICT di¤usion to income inequal-
ity. However, it is consistent with the mechanism of skill-biased technological change
emphasized by many authors. There are other examples in history when major tech-
nological change was accompanied by a rise in income inequality. These include the
9Personal computer ownership data are from the NBERs Cross-country Historical Adoption of
Technology (CHAT) data set available at http://www.nber.org/data/chat/. Data for years 2002 and
2003 are missing. Data on mobile celluar telephones and internet use are from the World Banks
infrastructure data set available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.
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Industrial Revolution in Great Britain from 1760 to 1860 (Greenwood, 1999) and the
U.S. economy during the 1920s (Atkinson, et al. 2011). Regarding the latter period,
Nicholas (2008) argues that the 1920s was a period of unprecedented technological
advance.
To formalize the process of technology di¤usion in the model, we employ the
following nonlinear law of motion
t = t 1 + t 1 (1  t 1) ; (1)
where t 2 [0; 1] represents the share of rms employing the new technology and
 > 0 governs the speed of di¤usion. Starting from a small positive value, the law of
motion implies t ! 1 as t ! 1: Figure 4 plots the theoretical di¤usion path with
 = 0:25 which is the calibration employed in our quantitative analysis. Starting at
0 = 0 in 1980, we assume that 1% of rms unilaterally adopt the new technology
at t = 1; corresponding to the year 1981. For t > 1; the theoretical di¤usion path
tracks roughly in between the observed di¤usion paths for personal computers, mobile
telephones, and internet use, reaching an adoption share of about 92% in 2010. The
theoretical di¤usion path takes about 18 years to move from a 10% adoption share to
90%. This result is close to the corresponding average period of 15 years estimated
by Jovanovich and Lach (1997) for a wide variety of new product innovations.
3 Model
The model economy consists of workers, capital owners, competitive rms, and the
government. There are n times more workers than capital owners, with the total
number of capital owners normalized to one. Capital owners represent the top decile
of households as measured by both wealth and income. Naturally, rms are owned
by the capital owners. Both types of agents supply labor endogenously to rms. The
governments only role is to redistribute income from capital owners to workers via
a lump-sum tax and transfer scheme.
3.1 Workers
The individual workersdecision problem is to maximize
bE0 1X
t=0
t
h
cwt   Dw Ht (`wt )
i1    1
1   ; (2)
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subject to the budget constraint
cwt = w
w
t `
w
t + Tt=n; (3)
where the symbol bEt represents the agents subjective expectation conditional on
information available at time t: Under rational expectations, bEt corresponds to the
mathematical expectation operator Et evaluated using the laws of motion that govern
the technology di¤usion process. The parameter  is the subjective time discount
factor, cwt is the individual workers consumption, and `
w
t is labor supply. Along the
lines of Greenwood, et al. (1988), the disutility of non-leisure time is governed by
the functional form (Dw=w) Ht (`wt )
 , where Dw > 0; and  > 1: This specication
implies that foregone leisure is adjusted to reect trend growth according to Ht =
exp(zt); where zt represents labor-augmenting technological progress, to be described
more fully below. The labor disutility function may be interpreted as the reduced form
of a more-elaborate specication that incorporates home production.10 The elasticity
of intertemporal substitution in labor supply is given by 1= (   1) : As  ! 1;
the model reduces to one with xed labor supply. The parameter  represents the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for the workers composite
consumption basket.
Workers are assumed to incur a transaction cost for saving or borrowing small
amounts which prohibits their participation in nancial markets. As a result, they
simply consume their income each period, consisting of labor income wwt `
w
t and a
per-worker transfer payment Tt=n received from the government.
The workers rst-order conditions with respect to cwt and `
w
t are given by
cwt  
Dw

Ht (`
w
t )

 
= wt ; (4)
DwHt (`
w
t )
 1

cwt  
Dw

Ht (`
w
t )

 
= wt w
w
t ; (5)
where wt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (3). Since
the worker makes no intertemporal decision, the subjective expectation operator bEt
does not appear in the rst-order conditions. The rst-order conditions imply the
following labor supply equation
`wt =

wwt
DwHt
 1
 1
: (6)
10The linearity inHt ensures that agentstime allocations are stationary along the models balanced
growth path. See Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1995, p. 161).
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3.2 Capital Owners
Capital owners represent the top decile of earners. Their decision problem is to
maximize
bE0 1X
t=0
t
h
c ct   D
c
 Ht (`
c
t)

i1    1
1   ; (7)
subject to the budget constraint
c ct + ptst+1 = w
c
t `
c
t + (pt + dt) st   Tt; (8)
where cct is the individual capital owners consumption and `
c
t is labor supply. For
simplicity, we assume that the functional form of the utility function and the pref-
erence parameters ; ; and  are the same for both capital owners and workers.
Capital owners earn labor income in the amount wct `
c
t and may invest in shares of
the rms equity in the amount st+1 at the ex-dividend price pt: Shares owned in the
previous period yield a dividend dt:11
Equity shares are assumed to exist in unit net supply. Market clearing therefore
implies st = 1 for all t: In equilibrium, the capital owners budget constraint becomes
c ct = w
c
t `
c + dt   Tt; which shows that the capital owners consumption is funded
from wage income and dividends, after subtracting a lump-sum tax levied by the
government.
The capital owners rst-order conditions with respect to c ct ; `
c
t ; and st+1 are given
by 
c ct  
Dc

Ht (`
c
t)

 
= ct ; (9)
DcHt (`
c
t)
 1

c ct  
Dc

Ht (`
c
t)

 
= ctw
c
t ; (10)
pt = bEt  ct+1
ct
(pt+1 + dt+1) ; (11)
where ct is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (8). The
capital owners labor supply equation is given by
`ct =

wct
DcHt
 1
 1
: (12)
11The capital owners decision problem can be represented in di¤erent ways. We employ this
particular decentralization because it shows the link between the rms equity price and investment.
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As Dc ! 1 we have `ct ! 0 such that only the workers supply labor. This case
corresponds to a standard framework for considering optimal redistributive capital
taxation (Judd 1985, Lansing 1999, and Krusell 2002).
3.3 Firms
Competitive rms are owned by the capital owners who we interpret as entrepreneurs.
Firms produce output according to the technology
yt = A
(
t
h
(1  t) k  kt + t [exp (zt) `ct ] k
i  `
 k + (1  t) [exp (zt) n `wt ] `
) 1 `
(13)
where  
k
 k   1
k
;  ` 
`   1
`
;
zt = zt 1 + ; (14)
t = 0 exp [ (t   0)] ; (15)
t = 0 exp [ (t   0)] ; (16)
t = t 1 + t 1 (1  t 1) ; (17)
with z0; 0; 0; and 0 given. The symbol kt is the rms stock of physical capital
and zt is a labor-augmenting technology process that evolves as a random walk with
drift. The drift parameter  determines the trend growth rate of output. We abstract
from stochastic variation in trend growth because we wish to focus on the dynamics
that arise from shifts in the income shares, as opposed to ordinary business cycle
uctuations. The parameter  k depends on the elasticity of substitution between
physical capital and entrepreneurial labor, denoted by k: The parameter  ` depends
on the elasticity of substitution between entrepreneurial inputs and workerslabor,
denoted by `:When ` > k, the production function exhibits what we call capital-
entrepreneurial skill complementarity.This means that entrepreneurial labor is more
complementary to physical capital than ordinary workerslabor. In other words, the
capital ownersentrepreneurial skills are more closely coupled to the physical assets
of the rm than are workersskills.
Motivated by the technology di¤usion process shown in Figure 4, our production
specication is intended to capture the emergence of unique business skills tied to
the spread of ICT. Examples would be the skills associated with setting up and
operating a technology company such as Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Ebay, Oracle,
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Google, etc. This type of skills yielded signicant monetary rewards (mainly in the
form of valuable stock options) to the founders and early employees who conceived
and executed the rms original business strategies. The entrepreneurial skills we
have in mind are much more concentrated than the broader college education-based
skills emphasized by Krusell, et al. (2000), Goldin and Katz (2007, 2008), Heathcote,
et al. (2010, 2011) and others. Our setup is motivated by empirical evidence which
shows that the observed trends in U.S. income inequality over the past three decades
were driven mainly by gains in top incomes, as documented in various ways by Autor,
et al. (2006), Lemieux (2006), Atkinson, et al. (2011), and OECD (2011).
When k = ` = 1 (or  k =  ` = 0), we recover the standard Cobb-Douglas
production technology which does not exhibit capital-entrepreneurial skill comple-
mentarity. When k ! 0 and ` ! 0 (or  k !  1 and  ` !  1), the production
technology takes a Leontief form such that capital and both types of labor become
perfect compliments. When k ! 1 and ` ! 1 (or  k ! 1 and  ` ! 1), capital
and both types of labor become perfect substitutes.
The OECD (2011) argues that technological progress and globalization have
shifted rmsproduction technologies in favor of highly-skilled workers, yielding these
workers higher rewards from labor at the expense of others who lack these unique
skills. We capture this idea by assuming that the representative rms production
technology (13) shifts over time, as governed by equations (15) through (17). Specif-
ically, the di¤usion process shifts the income share parameters t and t along an
S-shaped trajectory as the new technology is gradually adopted by rms. The state
variable t can be interpreted as the share of rms employing the new technology.
Our setup can also be viewed as capturing a process whereby old rms using obsolete
technology die o¤ over time and are replaced by new rms using the latest technol-
ogy. Along these lines, Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001, p. 1219) argue that major
technological change like the IT [information technology] revolution destroys old
rms. It does so by making machines, workers, and managers obsolete.
Goldin and Katz (2007) develop an analytical framework that allows CES pro-
duction function share parameters to shift over time as a way of capturing skill-biased
technological change. Our setup can be interpreted in the same way. To see this, we
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can rewrite the production function (13) as follows
yt = A exp (zt)
8><>:
"

 k
 `
t (1  t) k kn;t + 
 k
 `
t t (`
c
t)
 k
#  `
 k
+ (1  t) (n `wt ) `
9>=>;
1
 `
;
(18)
where we dene kn;t  kt= exp (zt) as the normalized capital stock (a stationary vari-
able). In the above formulation, shifts in zt represent neutraltechnology changes
that a¤ect output generally, whereas shifts in t or t represent biasedtechnology
changes that a¤ect the relative demand for the di¤erent productive inputs. Equation
(18) also shows that the quantitative impact of a given shift in either t or t on input
demand will depend on the values the substitution elasticity parameters k and `
which govern the values of  k and  `:
Equation (17) has two steady states at t = 0 and t = 1: At the initial steady
state, we have t = 0 and t = 0. At date t = 1; corresponding to the year 1981, we
assume that 1% of rms unilaterally adopt the new technology (or, alternatively, that
1% of existing rms die and are replaced by new rms using the new technology).
Given this initial impulse, the di¤usion law of motion implies t ! 1 as t!1: The
response parameters  and  govern the degree to which the technology di¤usion
shifts the production function parameters t and t; which in turn govern the shares of
wage and non-wage incomes going to the top decile of households. When  =  = 0;
the model economy grows along the no-change trend, such that the top decile
income share does not increase over time, but instead remains constant at the level
observed in 1980.
Resources devoted to investment augment the stock of physical capital according
to the law of motion
kt+1 = B k
1 
t i

t ; (19)
with k0 given. The parameter  2 (0; 1] is the elasticity of new capital with re-
spect to new investment. When  < 1; equation (19) reects the presence of capital
adjustment costs.12
Under the assumption that the labor market is competitive, rms take wages
as given and choose sequences of n `wt+j ; `
c
t+j ; and kt+1+j to maximize the following
12Equation (19) can be interpreted as a power-function approximation of the following specication
employed by Jermann (1998): kt+1 = kt [1   +  0 (it =kt) 1 ]:
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discounted stream of expected dividends:
bE0 1X
j=0
M ct+j
h
yt+j   wwt+j n `wt+j   wct+j `ct+j   it+j
i
| {z }
dt+j
; (20)
subject to the production function (13) and the law of motion for capital (19). Firms
act in the best interests of their owners such that dividends in period t + j are
discounted using the capital owners stochastic discount factor M ct+j   jct+j=ct ;
where ct is given by equation (9).
The rms rst-order conditions with respect to n `wt ; `
c
t ; and kt+1 are given by:
wwt = (1  sct) yt= (n `wt ) ; (21)
wct =

sct   skt

yt=`
c
t (22)
it= = EtM
c
t+1 [ s
k
t+1 yt+1   it+1 + it+1= ]; (23)
where sct represents the share of pre-tax income going to capital owners and s
k
t rep-
resents capitals share of total income. The share of pre-tax income going to workers
is 1   sct ; while labors share of total income is 1   skt : The share of pre-tax income
going to entrepreneurial labor is sct   skt :
Equations (21) and (22) show that each type of labor is paid its marginal product.
Comparing the rms intertemporal rst-order condition (23) to the equity pricing
equation (11) shows that the ex-dividend price of an equity share is given by pt = it=:
The equity share is a claim to a perpetual stream of dividends dt+1 = skt+1 yt+1  it+1
starting in period t + 1:13 The models adjustment cost specication (19) implies
a direct link between the equity price and investment, consistent with a standard
Tobins q framework. This feature is also consistent with the observed low-frequency
comovement between the S&P 500 stock price index and business investment in recent
decades, as documented by Lansing (2012).
13After taking the derivitive of the prot function (20) with respect to kt+1; we have multiplied
both sides of the resulting rst-order condition by kt+1; which is known at time t:
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Given the form of the production function (13), we have
sct =
@yt
@`ct
`ct
yt
+
@yt
@kt
kt
yt
=
t
h
(1  t) k  kn;t + t (`ct) k
i `
 k
t
h
(1  t) k  kn;t + t (`ct) k
i  `
 k + (1  t) (n `wt ) `
;(24)
skt =
@yt
@kt
kt
yt
=
t (1  t)
h
(1  t) k  kn;t + t (`ct) k
i `  k
 k k
 k
n;t
t
h
(1  t) k  kn;t + t (`ct) k
i  `
 k + (1  t) (n `wt ) `
; (25)
where kn;t  kt= exp (zt) : In the Cobb-Douglas case when  k =  ` = 0; the above
equations simplify to sct = t and s
k
t = t (1  t) :
3.4 Government
The government redistributes income from capital owners to workers by means of a
lump-sum tax and transfer scheme. We abstract from distortionary taxation given
that most of the revenue collected by distortionary taxes in the U.S. economy is used
for either direct government purchases of goods and services or debt service two
features which are absent from our model. Moreover, in the case of the OASDI
program, transfers are nanced by a tax on income up to a given threshold, so there
is no marginal tax distortion for income earned above the threshold.
We assume that the ratio of aggregate transfer payments to output in the model
is governed by the following law of motion:
 t  Tt=yt = 0 exp [ (t   0)] ; (26)
where  t represents the lump-sum tax rate and 0 is given. We link  t to the technol-
ogy adoption share t as a way of capturing the rising trend of U.S. transfer payments
relative to GDP plotted earlier in Figure 3. The underlying assumption is that the
rapid growth in various types of means-tested transfers and income security programs
from 1980 to 2010 reects a deliberate e¤ort by the government to try to o¤set the
trend of rising pre-tax income inequality. The response parameter  governs the
path of transfers during the transition period. Along the economys no-change trend,
we have  = 0 such that the ratio of transfers to GDP remains constant:
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3.5 Expectations
Following Heathcote, et al. (2010), we consider di¤erent assumptions about the
way in which agents form expectations about future variables that will a¤ect their
permanent income. Here, only rms and capital owners make forecasts about future
variables; workers simply consume their wage income plus transfers each period. In
the appendix, we show that the rms intertemporal rst-order condition (23) can be
written in terms of stationary variables as follows:
f (xt; `
c
t ; n `
w
t ; kn;t; t) = bEt h  xt+1; `ct+1; n `wt+1; kn;t+1; t+1 ; (27)
where xt  it=yt is the investment-output ratio and kn;t  kt= exp (zt) is the normal-
ized capital stock.
To establish a benchmark, we rst consider the standard case of rational expecta-
tions where agents are assumed to know the laws of motion governing the evolution
of future variables. In our setting, rational expectations corresponds to perfect fore-
sight because the laws of motion that govern trend growth and the di¤usion of new
technology abstract from stochastic variation. Under perfect foresight, we drop the
subjective expectation operator bEt in equation (27), thus yielding a set of determin-
istic nonlinear di¤erence equations that can be solved numerically, as described in
the appendix.
The notion that agents have perfect foresight about the process governing their
future income is obviously an extreme assumption. This is especially true in our
setting, where the economy is undergoing a never-before-seen shift in technology that
signicantly alters rmsproduction processes. At the other end of the information
spectrum, we might assume that agents are myopic, i.e., their forecast about a future
variable is given by the most recently-observed value of the same variable. This type
of forecast rule is optimal when the variable in question evolves as a random walk.
But even if this is not the case, a random walk forecast can be viewed as boundedly-
rational because it economizes on the costs of collecting and processing information.
As noted by Nerlove (1983, p. 1255): Purposeful economic agents have incentives
to eliminate errors up to a point justied by the costs of obtaining the information
necessary to do so...The most readily available and least costly information about
the future value of a variable is its past value.To implement myopic expectations in
equation (27), we assume bEt h (t+ 1) = h (t  1) ; which implies that agents do not
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observe the realized value h (t) at the time they construct their forecast.14
According to Heathcote et al. (2010, p. 717) Myopic beliefs and perfect fore-
sight represent polar extreme models for expectations, and presumably the truth lies
somewhere in between the two.Along these lines, we consider an intermediate case
labeled learning in which the share of rms and capital owners with knowledge
about the future transition path increases gradually over time as the new technol-
ogy is adopted. Put di¤erently, we assume that entrepreneurial agents who adopt
the new technology acquire knowledge about its speed of di¤usion and its implica-
tions for their future income. To implement learning in equation (27), we assumebEt h (t+ 1) = !t h (t+ 1) + (1  !t) h (t  1) ; where !t represents the fraction of
entrepreneurial agents with knowledge about the laws of motion governing the tran-
sition path. Intuitively, one might expect the fraction of knowledgeable agents to
start at zero and then increase gradually over time, eventually reaching unity when
the new technology has been fully adopted. We can achieve such a trajectory very
simply by linking the fraction of knowledgeable agents to the di¤usion process itself,
i.e., by imposing !t = t:
It should be noted that the learning regime can be interpreted as imposing an
even higher level of sophistication on the part of knowledgeable capital owners. Not
only do the knowledgeable capital owners need to understand the dynamics of the
exogenous technology di¤usion process, but now they also need to understand the
inuence of the remaining myopic capital owners on the future transition path of the
economy. For this reason, one could argue that myopic expectations regime is the
most plausible setup, given the assumed one-time shift in the production technology.
4 Model Calibration
Table 1 summarizes our choice of parameter values for the baseline model. Some
parameters are set to achieve target values for steady-state variables while others are
set to commonly-used values in the literature.
14Alternativelty, we could assume bEt h (t+ 1) = h (t) which would allow for simultaneity in the
observed and expected values of the forecast variables. For our setting, the solution turns out to
be nearly identical to the case where bEt h (t+ 1) = h (t  1) : This result may not hold for others
settings, however. See, for example, Lettau and Van Zandt (2003).
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Table 1: Baseline Model Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description/Target
n 9 Capital owners = top income decile.
 0:02 Per capita trend growth = 2%:
 2 EIS = 1= = 0:5:
 0:964 Equity return = 8%:
 3 Labor supply elasticity = 0:5:
Dw 0:65 Initial worker labor supply `w = 1:
Dc 5:54 Initial relative wage wc=ww = 2:
k 0:4 Empirical estimates.
` 1:0 Empirical estimates.
A 0:816 Match Cobb-Douglas initial steady state.
B 1:273 Initial steady-state k=y = 2:6 0:8:
 0:088 Initial steady-state i=y = 0:21 0:8:
 0:25 Match ICT di¤usion path for U.S. economy.
0 0 Initial steady state  = 0:
0 0:350 Initial steady-state sc = 0:35:
0 0:001 Initial steady-state s
k = 0:35 0:8 = 0:28:
0 0:100 Initial steady-state transfers/GDP = 10%:
 0:336 Final steady-state sc = 0:49:
 0:685 Final steady-state sk = 0:41 0:8 = 0:328:
 0:405 Final steady-state transfers/GDP = 15%:
The time period in the model is one year. The number of workers per capital
owner is n = 9 so that capital owners represent the top decile of households. In the
model, capital owners possess 100% of the physical capital wealth, whereas the top
decile of U.S. households owns approximately 80% of nancial wealth. Our setup
implies a Gini coe¢ cient for physical capital wealth of 0.90. The Gini coe¢ cient for
nancial wealth in U.S. data has ranged between 0.89 and 0.93 over the period 1983
to 2001.15
The parameter  = 0:02 implies a per capita trend growth rate of 2%, consistent
with the long-run U.S. average. The value  = 2 implies an EIS of 1= = 0:5 for the
composite consumption basket of each agent a typical value.16 In the sensitivity
analysis, we also consider the values 1= = 1 and 1= = 0:33: Given the baseline
values for  and ; we choose  such that the steady-state net equity return is rs =
 1 exp ()   1 = 8%, consistent with the long-run real return on the S&P 500
stock price index.
15See Wol¤ (2006), Table 4.2, p. 113.
16See, for example, Mendoza (2010).
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We choose  = 3 to achieve an intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor
supply of (   1) 1 = 0:5, consistent with the range of estimates obtained by Eissa
(1996) and Mulligan (1999), among others. In the sensitivity analysis, we also ex-
amine the e¤ects of a more-elastic labor supply with (   1) 1 = 1:5. We choose
the labor supply disutility parameter Dw in order to normalize `w = 1 at the initial
steady state. Given this value, we choose Dc to achieve a target relative wage at the
initial steady state of wc=ww = 2: For comparison, Heathcote, et al. (2010, p. 686)
report a male college wage premium of about 1.4 in 1980, whereas Gottschalk and
Danziger (2005, p. 238) report a male wage ratio of about 4 when comparing the
top decile to the bottom decile. The wage ratio wc=ww in our model compares the
top decile to the remainder of households, so we would expect it to fall somewhere in
between the values reported by the two studies, but likely closer to the value reported
by Heathcote, et al. (2010).
The baseline values for the production function curvature parameters k and `
strike a balance between various empirical estimates. Using data on the observed
wage premium of college-educated workers in the U.S. economy from 1963 to 1992,
Krusell, et al. (2000, p. 1041) estimate a substitution elasticity of 0.67 between equip-
ment capital and skilled labor. They estimate a substitution elasticity of 1.67 between
equipment capital and unskilled labor. There is also a large literature that estimates
the elasticity of substitution between aggregate physical capital and aggregate labor,
without distinguishing between skilled versus unskilled labor. In a review of this lit-
erature, Chirinko (2008) concludes that the evidence suggests a range of 0.4 to 0.6 for
the aggregate capital-labor substitution elasticity. The capital-entrepreneurial skill
complementarity e¤ect considered here applies to the top decile which is a more exclu-
sive group than the pool of college-educated workers. Workers comprise nine-tenths
of the population in our model, and thus represent a broader group than the pool of
unskilled (non-college) workers. Based on this reasoning, we set k = 0:4 and ` = 1;
which imply that both types of labor in our model exhibit stronger complementarity
to physical capital than the college versus non-college workers considered by Krusell,
et al. (2000). In the sensitivity analysis, we consider di¤erent combinations of values
for k and `; including the Cobb-Douglas case when k = ` = 1:
We normalize the production function parameter A to unity in the Cobb-Douglas
case. When k 6= 1 or ` 6= 1; we choose the value of A to maintain the same initial
steady-state value of kn as in the Cobb-Douglas model. In this way, changes in either
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k or ` identify a family of CES production functions that are distinguished only
by the elasticity parameters, and not by their initial steady-state allocations.17 The
parameter B in the capital law of motion (19) is chosen to be consistent with the
long-run average capital-output ratio in the U.S. economy. The average ratio from
annual data is about 2:6; but this gure includes all physical capital whereas the top
decile of U.S. households owns about 80% of nancial wealth. We therefore apply a
scale factor of 0:8 to the U.S. capital-output ratio to arrive at a target capital-output
ratio of 2:08 for the model. The parameter  in the capital law of motion (19) is
chosen to be consistent with the U.S. average investment-output ratio of about 0:21
(including business investment and purchases of consumer durables). We again apply
a scale factor of 0:8 to the U.S. ratio to arrive at a target investment-output ratio of
0:168 for the model.
The initial share parameter 0 = 0:35 is chosen to match the 35% income share
of the top decile of U.S. households in 1980, as plotted earlier in Figure 1. Similarly,
we choose 0 to match capitals share of total income in the U.S. economy in 1980,
also plotted in Figure 1. Similar to the other capital-related parameters, we apply
a scale factor of 0:8 to the 1980 capital income share of 0:35, resulting in an initial
steady-state capital share in the model of 0:28: The technology di¤usion speed is set
to  = 0:25, as noted earlier in the discussion of Figure 4 and implies that technology
adoption is about 92% complete after three decades. Given 0; 0 and ; we choose
 and  to achieve target values for the top decile income share sc and the capital
share sk at the nal steady state. The target values at the nal steady state are
slightly above the (scaled) end-of-sample values plotted in Figure 1. Finally, we
choose 0 = 0:10 to match the 10% ratio of U.S. transfers to GDP in 1980, as shown
in Figure 3. Based on the trend plotted in Figure 3, we choose  to achieve a target
ratio of 15% at the nal steady state.
5 Quantitative Results
In this section, we examine the quantitative implications of the model via numeri-
cal simulations. We rst consider the baseline models dynamic response to shifting
income shares under di¤erent expectation regimes. Next, we examine the implica-
tions of departing from the baseline assumptions regarding the path for redistributive
17Klump and Saam (2008) emphasize that such a normalization procedure is necessary to avoid
arbitrary and inconsistent resultswhen comparing CES production models with di¤erent parame-
terizations.
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government transfers, the path for capitals share of total income, and the degree of
capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity. Finally, we consider the welfare conse-
quences of rising income inequality and its sensitivity to di¤erent model specications
and parameter values. Details regarding the model solution procedure and the welfare
computation are contained in the appendix.
5.1 Dynamic Response to Shifting Income Shares: Baseline Model
Figure 5 plots the transition paths for selected model variables starting from the initial
steady state with 0 = 0: At date t = 1; we assume that 1% of rms unilaterally
adopt the new technology. For t > 1; the technology di¤usion process is governed by
equations (15) through (17). For each variable, we plot the equilibrium trajectory
for three di¤erent expectation regimes: perfect foresight (solid blue line), myopic
expectations (dashed red line), and learning (dash-dotted green line).
The top left panel of Figure 5 plots the transition path for the top decile income
share sct . By design, the model path roughly approximates the U.S. top decile income
share shown earlier in Figure 1. The model path starts at 35% and then increases
to about 48% at t = 30; corresponding to the year 2010. Our baseline calibration
with ` = 1 implies  ` = 0 such that s
c
t = t from equation (24). Since t follows an
exogenous law of motion, expectations do not inuence the trajectory of sct ; unlike
the other variables in the gure. Capitals share of total income skt (top right panel)
starts from an initial steady state of 28% and eventually reaches a nal steady state
of 32.8%. In between, the trajectory is governed by equation (25) which depends on
the endogenous variables kn;t and `ct even when  ` = 0: Under all three expectation
regimes, the transition path for skt exhibits some overshooting such that value at
t = 30 is somewhat above the nal steady state value.
The role of expectations is most clearly illustrated in the middle left panel of
Figure 5, which plots the equilibrium investment-output ratio it=yt. Under perfect
foresight, the investment-output ratio drops sharply at t = 1: This is because capital
owners foresee the large increase in their permanent income over the future transition
period. As a result, they immediately increase their consumption at the expense of
investment. While such dynamics do not seem very plausible, it must be remembered
that our model abstracts from stochastic shocks which would introduce a precaution-
ary saving motive, thus limiting the sharp drop in the investment-output ratio.18
18Our closed economy model also abstracts from foreign capital inows. Such inows could nance
an increase in domestic investment even if there were a sharp drop in domestic saving.
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Figure 5: Under perfect foresight, the investment-output ratio drops sharply at t = 1
because capital owners forsee the increase in their permanent income. The drop in
investment slows capital accumulation, thereby hindering the growth of wages and
total income relative to the model with either myopic expectations or learning.
Under myopic expectations, capital owners do not foresee the increase in their
permanent income. Consequently, their consumption at t = 1 does not jump (in-
vestment at t = 1 does not fall), but rather the capital owners consumption and
investment both increase gradually along with current income. Under learning, the
trajectories for all variables initially mimic those under myopic expectations, but the
paths eventually catch-up and merge with the perfect foresight trajectories.
The middle right panel of Figure 5 plots the evolution of the capital stock ex-
pressed as a percent deviation from the no-change trend (which holds income shares
constant at their initial levels). The capital stock increases fastest under myopic
expectations due to the higher investment trajectory, which boosts capital accumu-
lation. In contrast, the perfect foresight path for the capital stock initially drops
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below the no-change trend due to the sharp drop in the investment-output ratio at
t = 1: Later, however, the rising marginal product of capital from the technology
di¤usion process (as summarized by the shifts in t and t) stimulates an increase in
investment which allows the capital stock to surpass the no-change trend.
The bottom panels in Figure 5 plot the agents total income after taxes and
transfers, again expressed as percent deviations from the no-change trend. These two
panels provide insight into the welfare e¤ects to be discussed later. In the bottom
left panel, the capital owners total income increases fastest under myopic expecta-
tions and slowest under perfect foresight. This is due to the faster rate of capital
accumulation under myopic expectations which contributes to faster wage growth
for capital owners. But workers also receive wage benets from faster capital accu-
mulation. The bottom right panel shows that the workers total income is highest
under myopic expectations and lowest under perfect foresight. For workers, more in-
come translates directly into more consumption, which in turn contributes to higher
welfare. For capital owners, more income under myopic expectations translates into
more investment, thus postponing consumption and reducing welfare relative to the
perfect foresight case. Hence, as we shall see, myopia is harmful for capital owners
welfare but benecial for workerswelfare.
Figure 6 plots the paths of some additional model variables as percent deviations
from the no-change trend. The top left panel shows the immediate jump in the capital
owners consumption that occurs under perfect foresight. This is the ip-side to the
sharp drop in the investment-output ratio shown in Figure 5. The immediate jump
in the capital owners consumption hinders capital accumulation, which lowers the
wage paths for both capital owners and workers, as shown in the two middle panels.
The top right panel of the gure shows that myopic expectations deliver the most
favorable consumption path for workers, again because faster capital accumulation
boosts wages relative to the other two expectation regimes. Notice that the path
for the workers consumption in Figure 6 is identical to the path for the workers
total income (including transfers) shown in Figure 5. The workers consumption
under myopic expectations initially declines relative to the no-change trend as the
technology shift relentlessly shrinks the pre-tax income share of workers. Eventually,
however, when t & 30; recovering wages for workers (from capital accumulation)
together with rising transfer payments from the government lead to an increase in
the workers consumption relative to the no-change trend. As a result, the myopic
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Figure 6: The capital owners consumption jumps immediately at t = 1 under perfect
foresight. This hinders capital accumulation and lowers the wage trajectories for
both capital owners and workers. The myopic expectations regime delivers the most
favorable consumption trajectory for workers because faster capital accumulation
boosts wages relative to the other two expectation regimes. The transition paths for
labor hours mimic the patterns for wages.
expectations regime can deliver welfare gains to workers.
To better understand the behavior of wages during the transition, we can combine
the rms rst-order conditions (21) and (22) with the labor supply equations (6) and
(12) to obtain the following equilibrium relationship
wwt = w
c
t

1  sct
sct   skt

`ct
n `wt
;
= wct

1  sct
sct   skt
  1


Dw
Dc
 1

; (28)
which is a similar to the standard skill premium equation estimated by numerous
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empirical studies.19 The term in square brackets summarizes the e¤ects of skill-
biased or skill-replacing changes in technology. Changes in the ratio `ct= (n `
w
t )
capture shifts the relative supplies of the two types of labor.
Equation (28) shows that the workers wage wwt is inuenced by several variables.
An increase in the capital owners wage wct (due to technology di¤usion or ordinary
trend growth) will serve to increase the workers wage. In contrast, an increase
in the top decile income share sct or an increase in the wage income share of the
top decile sct   skt will both serve to decrease the workers wage. All else equal, an
increase in capitals share of total income skt will serve to increase the workers wage.
The strength of these various opposing e¤ects depends strongly on the degree of
capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity. In the baseline model with k < `,
capital owners enjoy a large increase in wct as the technology di¤usion increases the
productivity of both capital and entrepreneurial labor which are tightly coupled when
k = 0:4: The increase in wct helps to o¤set the upward shifts in s
c
t and s
c
t skt such that
the equilibrium path for wwt is higher than otherwise. As evidence, the middle panels
of Figure 6 show that the largest increase in wct occurs under myopic expectations,
which also delivers the most favorable path for wwt :
The bottom panels of Figure 6 show that the transition paths for labor hours
mimic the patterns for wages. This is a direct consequence of the labor supply equa-
tions (6) and (12) which show that movements in `wt and `
c
t are directly proportional
to movements in wwt and w
c
t ; respectively. The increase in labor hours for capital
owners, together with the increase in the productivity of the two entrepreneurial in-
puts (kt and `ct) is more than enough to o¤set the decline in the worker labor hours.
As a result, aggregate output eventually surpasses the no-change trend under all ex-
pectation regimes (top left panel of Figure 10). The higher level of aggregate output
boosts the amount of redistributive transfers received by workers each period since
transfers are computed as a fraction of GDP.
5.2 Departures from the Baseline Model
We now consider three experiments that depart from the baseline model.20 The re-
sults will prove helpful for understanding the welfare e¤ects to be discussed later. The
19See, for example, Goldin and Katz (2007, p. 7) and Acemoglu and Autor (2012, p. 434).
20Whenever a parameter value is changed from the baseline value shown in Table 1, we recalibrate
the remaining parameters, where applicable, to achieve the same empirical targets as the baseline
model.
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Figure 7: When the ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP is held constant at its
initial level, wage paths are lower than the baseline paths under perfect foresight
but higher than the baseline paths under myopic expectations. Holding capitals
share of income constant at its initial level lowers the wage paths of both types of
agents relative to the baseline paths. The results for the Cobb-Douglas model are
qualitatively similar to those for holding skt constant, but the quantitative e¤ects on
the wage paths are now much larger.
rst experiment imposes  = 0 in equation (26) such that the ratio of redistributive
government transfers to GDP remains constant at the 1980 level of Tt=yt = 10%;
rather than increasing to 15% as in the data. The second experiment holds capitals
share of total income constant at the initial calibrated level of sk0 = 0:350:8 = 0:28;
rather than increasing to a nal share of 0:41 0:8 = 0:328:21 The third experiment
imposes k = ` = 1 in equation (13) to recover a standard Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function which omits the feature of capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity.
21For this experiment, the target top decile income share at the nal steady state is adjusted
downward from the baseline value of sc = 0:49 to sc = 0:442 in order to maintain the same absolute
change in the top decile wage income share as in the baseline model. We then solve for a sequence
of values for t from t = 1 to t = 1500 such that s
k
t = s
k
0 while t is governed by equation (12) using
the re-calibrated value  = 0:234.
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Figure 7 shows how each experiment inuences the path of wages, as expressed in
percent deviations from the no-change trend. Figures 8 and 9 show the e¤ects on the
actual consumption trajectories of capital owners and workers. Figure 10 shows the
e¤ects on aggregate output.22
In the baseline model, the capital owners consumption rises faster than the no-
change trend under all expectation regimes (top left panel of Figure 8).
Figure 8: Holding transfers to GDP constant boosts the capital owners consumption
trajectory relative to the baseline model. The opposite is true when either capitals
share of total income is held constant or when the production function is Cobb-
Douglas. In all cases, however, the capital owners consumption trajectory surpasses
the no-change trend.
The workers consumption in the baseline model initially falls below the no-change
trend as the top decile income share shifts upward in favor of capital owners (top left
panel of Figure 9). But under myopic expectations, the workers consumption later
starts catching up and can even surpass the no-change trend as rising wages (from
22For clarity, we omit the learning regime plots in Figures 7 through 10 because these always track
in between the plots for the other two expectation regimes.
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capital accumulation) and rising transfer payments from the government increase the
workers total income.
Figure 9: Under myopic expectations, the workers consumption trajectory can sur-
pass the no-change trend for t & 35 in the baseline model and when transfers to GDP
are held constant. However, the workers consumption trajectory remains below the
no-change trend when capitals share of total income is held constant or when the
production function is Cobb-Douglas.
Under perfect foresight, aggregate output in the baseline model initially experi-
ences a slowdown relative to the no-change trend, but growth later accelerates to
allow output to surpass the no-change trend for t > 25 (top left panel of Figure 10).
This type of trajectory is consistent with the narratives emphasized by Hornstein and
Krusell (1996) and Greenwood and Yörüko¼glu (1997) whereby a skill-biased technol-
ogy improvement initially leads to a measured slowdown in total factor productivity.
The empirical evidence on the links between income inequality and growth remains
inconclusive. In a recent cross-country study, Berg and Ostry (2011) nd that higher
levels of income inequality are often (but not always) associated with shorter growth
spells, such that higher inequality tends to reduce an economys average long-run
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Figure 10: In the baseline model, aggregate output surpasses the no-change trend
during the transition as the technology shift increases the productivity of physical
capital and entrepreneurial labor. A similar results obtains when holding transfers to
GDP constant. But aggregate output grows slower than the no change trend when
capitals share of total income is held constant or when the production function is
Cobb-Douglas.
growth rate. Figure 10 shows that, depending on assumptions, our model can pro-
duce simulations in which rising income inequality is associated with either faster or
slower output growth in comparison to the no-change trend.
E¤ect of Redistributive Government Transfers
Under perfect foresight, holding Tt=yt constant lowers the wage paths for both
types of agents relative to the baseline paths (top panels of Figure 7). In contrast,
the wage paths for both types of agents are raised relative to the baseline paths
under myopic expectations (bottom panels of Figure 7). Holding Tt=yt constant leads
to a larger initial jump in the capital owners consumption under perfect foresight
because the agent foresees that future lump-sum tax rates will not be increasing, thus
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implying higher permanent income relative to the baseline model. While benecial
for the welfare of capital owners, the larger initial jump in consumption slows capital
accumulation which depresses the wage paths of both types of agents relative to the
baseline model. In the case of myopic expectations, holding Tt=yt constant allows the
capital owners consumption and investment to both increase faster than the baseline
paths because after-tax income is now higher in each period. The resulting boost
in capital accumulation raises the wage paths of both types of agents relative to the
baseline wage paths. In the long-run, the ratio of lump-sum transfers to GDP has
no e¤ect on the marginal products of labor so the wage paths eventually converge to
the baseline paths, regardless of the expectation regime.
Under perfect foresight, holding Tt=yt constant leads to a larger initial jump in the
capital owners consumption (top right panel of Figure 8). The larger initial jump is
detrimental to the workers wage and consumption paths. But under myopic expec-
tations, the higher after-tax income for capital owners induces higher investment and
hence a higher wage path for workers relative to the baseline model. Consequently,
the workers consumption path can still catch up and surpass the no-change trend,
despite the constant transfer ratio (top right panel of Figure 9). Aggregate output
surpasses the no-change trend under both expectations regimes (top right panel of
Figure 10).
E¤ect of Capitals Share of Total Income
Figure 7 shows that holding skt constant lowers the wage paths for both types of
agents relative to the baseline paths, regardless of the expectation regime. The capital
owners wage path continues to signicantly exceed the no-change trend (i.e., the
percent deviation remains in positive territory) but the workers wage path now drops
below the no-change trend and stays there representing a permanent downward level
shift. This experiment shows that both types of agents derive wage benets from a rise
in capitals share of total income even though capital ownership is concentrated in the
hands of the top decile. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Since factor
markets are competitive, any increase in skt reects an increase in the productivity
of physical capital. In the presence of capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity,
a more productive capital stock also raises the marginal product of entrepreneurial
labor, thus bestowing wage benets on capital owners. The equilibrium conditions
of the labor market, as summarized by equation (28), imply that workers can also
receive wage benets, since the marginal products of both types of labor are positively
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linked along the models balanced growth path.
In Figures 8 and 9, we see that holding skt constant leads to less-favorable con-
sumption trajectories for both types of agents relative to the baseline model. This
result is due to the less-favorable income paths for both types of agents. The capital
owners consumption trajectory still exceeds the no-change trend (bottom left panel
of Figure 8) but the workers consumption trajectory now drops below the this trend
and remains there (bottom left panel of Figure 9). Recall that in the baseline model,
the workers consumption trajectory was able to eventually surpass the no-change
trend, particularly under myopic expectations. The bottom left panel of Figure 10
shows that aggregate output grows slower than the no-change trend when skt is held
constant. This is because the technology change now omits an important feature that
serves to increase the productivity of both physical capital and entrepreneurial labor
(which are strong compliments in production).
E¤ect of Capital-Entrepreneurial Skill Complementarity
The Cobb-Douglas experiment can be viewed as a more extreme version of the
previous experiment that holds skt constant. The absence of capital-entrepreneurial
skill complementarity means that a technology change which raises the productivity
of physical capital yields lower wage paths than otherwise for both types of agents.
Figure 7 shows that the wage paths in the Cobb-Douglas model are signicantly lower
than the baseline paths, regardless of the expectation regime. Although wct continues
to exceed the no-change trend, the magnitude of the increase is now much smaller
than in the baseline model. The behavior of the workers wage can once again be
understood from the labor market equilibrium relationship (28). The smaller net
increase in wct over the transition means that the dynamics of w
w
t now tend to be
dominated by shifts in the income shares sct and s
c
t skt ; which transfer resources away
from workers. Accordingly, the permanent shifts in the income shares now push wwt
well below the no-change trend.
The lower wage path for workers reduces their labor supply by enough to keep
aggregate output well-below the no-change trend (bottom right panel of Figure 10).
Lower output during the transition implies lower transfer payments for workers since
transfers are computed as a fraction of aggregate output. Consequently, the workers
total income takes a hit from two sides: lower wages and a lower level of transfers
than otherwise, resulting in a severe drop in consumption relative to both the baseline
model and the no-change trend (bottom right panel of Figure 9).
35
The capital owners consumption trajectory still exceeds the no-change trend, but
the gains are much smaller than in the baseline model (bottom right panel of Figure
8). Although capital owners receive a lower wage path relative to the baseline model,
the e¤ect on their consumption trajectory is mitigated by a lower level of lump sum
taxes that must be paid to the government each period.
5.3 Welfare Analysis
Table 2 summarizes the welfare e¤ects of rising income inequality for a variety of
di¤erent model specications. Welfare e¤ects are measured by the constant percent-
age amount by which the agents composite consumption basket in the no-change
economy must be adjusted upward or downward each period to make lifetime utility
equal to that obtained in the transition economy. Going from left to right in the ta-
ble, the three expectation regimes postulate successively higher degrees of knowledge
about the economys future transition path on the part of capital owners. The boxed
entries in the table represent the best welfare outcome for each type of agent in a
given expectation regime.
Table 2: Welfare E¤ects of Rising Income Inequality
Myopic Expectations Learning Perfect Foresight
Model
Specication
Capital
Owners Workers
Capital
Owners Workers
Capital
Owners Workers
Baseline 9.09 1.51 14.9 0.56 31.7  1:28
Constant Tt=yt 16.2  0:15 25.3  2:38 66.2  6:78
Constant skt 1.13  2:58 2.93  3:08 8.18  3:88
Cobb-Douglas 0.37  12:5 2.62  12:9 9.01  13:6
k = 0:8; ` = 1 2.62  9:08 5.80  9:64 14.9  10:6
k = 0:4; ` = 1:4 8.23 0.78 13.4  0:05 26.5  1:47
1= = 1 14.4 1.05 17.5 0.62 23.1  0:01
1= = 0:33 6.48 1.67 12.5 0.52 36.8  2:16
(   1) 1 = 1:5 4.45 0.92 6.74 0.63 11.9 0.04
 = 0:20 7.24 1.21 11.5 0.50 27.7  1:32
 = 0:982 13.3 2.14 23.0 0.68 40.0  1:06
Notes: Baseline model uses k = 0:4 and ` = 1: Cobb-Douglas model uses k = ` = 1: Welfare e¤ects
are measured by the percentage change in the per-period consumption basket to make the agent indi¤erent
between the no-change economy (which holds income shares constant) and the transition economy. Boxed
entries represent the best welfare outcome for each type of agent in a given expectation regime.
.
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All of the various model specications in Table 2 deliver positive welfare gains for
the capital owners. The gains increase monotonically from left to right along with
capital ownersknowledge about the future transition path. Conversely, the welfare
outcomes for workers decline monotonically from left to right. At the extreme right
under perfect foresight, the welfare outcomes for workers are almost always negative.
The sole exception is when both types of agents have a more elastic labor supply, i.e.,
when (   1) 1 = 1:5: This case is discussed in more detail below.
For the baseline model, the welfare gains for capital owners range from 9% under
myopic expectations to about 32% under perfect foresight. The huge gain for capital
owners under perfect foresight derives from the initial consumption jump at t = 1:
Workers achieve a welfare gain of 1.5% under myopic expectations but su¤er a welfare
loss of about 1.3% under perfect foresight. The workersloss under perfect foresight
derives from the negative wage impacts induced by slower capital accumulation when
the investment-output ratio drops sharply at t = 1: The welfare results under learning
fall in between those for the other two expectation regimes. In the baseline learning
regime, workers still manage to achieve a welfare gain of 0.5% while the welfare gain
for capital owners is now 12.5%.
As expected, holding Tt=yt constant is benecial for capital owners but detrimen-
tal to workers. In the absence of a rising ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP, the
workers always su¤er a welfare loss that ranges from  0:15% under myopic expecta-
tions to  6:8% under perfect foresight. The boxed entries show that this particular
model specication delivers the most favorable welfare outcomes for capital owners,
regardless of the expectation regime. Interestingly, however, this specication does
not deliver the worst welfare outcome for workers. Holding Tt=yt constant boosts the
after-tax income of capital owners which leads to higher investment than otherwise.
The resulting faster rate of capital accumulation delivers wage benets to workers
which help to mitigate the loss of some transfer payments. Recall that the workers
consumption trajectory can still surpass the no-change trend even when transfer-to-
GDP ratio is held constant at 10% (top right panel of Figure 9).
As noted previously, the Cobb-Douglas experiment can be viewed as a more ex-
treme version of the experiment that holds skt constant. Table 2 shows that both of
these experiments deliver less favorable welfare outcomes in each cell when compared
to the baseline model. This result is due to the less favorable wage paths obtained
in these experiments, as shown earlier in Figure 7. The less favorable wage paths
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reduce agentslabor supply relative to the baseline model, leading to slower growth
in aggregate output during the transition (bottom panels of Figure 10). Of all the dif-
ferent specications reported in Table 2, the Cobb-Douglas model delivers the worst
welfare outcomes for workers, regardless of the expectation regime. This result is
striking, particularly since Cobb-Douglas production functions are commonly used in
the theoretical and empirical literature on income inequality. Our results show that
the use of a Cobb-Douglas specication can lead to a downward bias when gauging
the welfare consequences of shifting income shares.
We also experimented with changing either k and ` individually. When k = 0:8
(with ` maintained at the baseline value of 1), the degree of capital-entrepreneurial
skill complementarity is weaker than in the baseline model but stronger than in the
Cobb-Douglas model. Table 2 shows that this experiment delivers better welfare
outcomes than the Cobb-Douglas model, but both types of agents are still worse-
o¤ relative to the baseline model which has k = 0:4. When ` = 1:4 (with k
maintained at the baseline value of 0.4), both types of agents are again worse-o¤
relative to the baseline model, but the decline in welfare outcomes is less severe than
in the previous experiment with k = 0:8. Hence, in the presence of a technological
change that makes physical capital more productive, both types of agents will benet
if either types labor supply becomes more complementary with physical capital.
Variations in the parameter  a¤ect the EIS for the agentscomposite consump-
tion baskets. Recall that the baseline EIS for both types of agents is 1= = 0:5.
We experimented with setting 1= = 1 or 1= = 0:33; which allow for a higher or
lower EIS than the baseline model. For capital owners, the EIS governs the relative
size of the income and substitution e¤ects of the technology change which, in turn,
pin down the optimal split between consumption and investment along the transition
path. Under perfect foresight, an EIS closer to unity implies a weaker income e¤ect
which implies a smaller jump in the capital owners consumption at t = 1: This situa-
tion lowers the capital owners welfare relative to the baseline model, but benets the
workers welfare. However, under myopic expectations and learning, an EIS closer to
unity implies a stronger income e¤ect because capital owners now react to current
income. A stronger income e¤ect raises the capital owners consumption trajectory
relative to the baseline model. This is benecial for the capital owners welfare but
since capital accumulation is now slower, the welfare of workers declines relative to
the baseline model. All of these e¤ects are reversed when the EIS is further away
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from unity than the baseline value. For both types of agents, the EIS also inuences
the lifetime utility evaluation of a given consumption trajectory. But this e¤ect is of
second-order importance when compared to e¤ect of the EIS on the level and slope
of the consumption trajectory itself.
Our baseline calibration assumed a labor supply elasticity of (   1) 1 = 0:5
for both types of agents. Keane and Rogerson (2012) argue that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for labor supply at the macro level is in the range of 1 to 2.
Consistent with this view, we set (   1) 1 = 1:5. The results of this experiment are
mixed. Capital owners are made worse-o¤ relative to the baseline model under all
three expectation regimes. Workers are made worse-o¤ under myopic expectations,
but their welfare outcomes are improved under learning and perfect foresight. In
the case of capital owners, a more-elastic labor supply moderates the increase in
their equilibrium wage path, since an increase in the price of their labor now brings
forth more supply. This e¤ect, together with the associated reduction in leisure time,
moderates their welfare gains in comparison to the baseline model. Workers benet
from a higher aggregate labor supply because it raises the level of aggregate output
and hence transfers. Recall, however, that the technology change causes the workers
own labor supply to initially decline relative to the no-change trend, particularly
under learning or perfect foresight (bottom right panel of Figure 6). The decrease in
their own labor supply results in more leisure time which, all else equal, is benecial
for their welfare. Relative to the baseline model, the positive e¤ects on workers
welfare outweigh the negative e¤ects under learning and perfect foresight. Table 2
shows that the calibration with (   1) 1 = 1:5 delivers positive welfare gains for
workers under all three expectation regimes.
The second-to-last row of Table 2 shows the e¤ects of a slower di¤usion speed for
new technology. When  = 0:20; the di¤usion process is only 71% complete by the
year 2010 versus 92% in the baseline model. The movement from a 10% adoption
share to 90% now takes 22 years versus 18 years in the baseline model. Both capital
owners and workers are made worse o¤ by the slower di¤usion speed, with the e¤ect
on capital owners being more pronounced. This experiment shows that more-rapid
technological change can yield benets to all agents, even when the technology change
is biased in favor of highly-skilled workers.
The last row of Table 2 shows the e¤ect of assuming that both types of agents
are more patient. When  = 0:982; the steady-state net equity return is 6% versus
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8% in the baseline model. As with the EIS for consumption, a change in  has
a rst-order e¤ect on the level and slope of the agents consumption trajectories
and a second-order e¤ect on the lifetime utility evaluation of a given consumption
trajectory. A higher value for  improves the welfare outcomes for both types of
agents relative to the baseline model. In the case of capital owners, increased patience
yields more investment which, in turn, boosts the wage paths of both types of agents
via faster capital accumulation. In the case of workers, a higher wage path allows more
consumption than otherwise. In addition, the recovery in the workers consumption
trajectory that occurs later in the transition (top left panel of Figure 9) is now given
more weight when computing lifetime utility.
Overall, we nd that the range of possible welfare outcomes for both types of
agents is enormous. The range of results presented in Table 2 might be viewed as
something akin to a condence interval for the potential welfare e¤ects of rising U.S.
income inequality over the past three decades. The welfare gains for capital owners
range from a low of 0.37% (Cobb-Douglas, myopic expectations) to a high of 66.2%
(constant Tt=yt; perfect foresight). The welfare outcomes for workers range from a
low of  13:6% (Cobb-Douglas, perfect foresight) to a high of 2.62% ( = 0:982;
myopic expectations). We acknowledge that some of the model specications are
more relevant than others for comparison with the U.S. experience. In particular,
the perfect foresight regime could be viewed as implausible while the specications
that hold either Tt=yt or skt constant are counterfactual. It should also be noted
that the welfare outcomes for both types of agents would be scaled downward if we
had assumed that redistributive transfers were nanced by a distortionary tax on
capital ownersincome. Nevertheless, the main point to be taken away from Table
2 is that the welfare consequences of rising income inequality are highly uncertain,
even in the relatively simple framework considered here with only types of agents.
This nding would likely extend to more complex model environments that include
the basic elements observed in the data, namely, rising income inequality and a stable
distribution of nancial wealth.
6 Conclusion
The U.S. economy experienced a profound upward shift in the share of income going
to the top decile of households over the past three decades. The evidence suggests
that some form of skill-biased technological change played an important role in this
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trend. We developed a model of skill-biased technological change in which the share
parameters of a CES production function shift over time, similar to the framework of
Goldin and Katz (2008). But in contrast to much of the literature in this area, our
approach focused on a technology-induced shift in the demand for entrepreneurial
labor, representing top incomes, as opposed to the broader pool of college-educated
labor. Empirical evidence shows that even among college-educated workers, the in-
come gains of the highest earners are the primary driving force for rising U.S. income
inequality.
Our analysis shows that the top decile of agents in the model always benet
from the technology change, but their degree of foresight inuences the size of their
welfare gains. Workers outside the top decile can also benet when three elements
are in place, namely, a rising ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP, an increase
in capitals share of total income, and a strong degree of complementarity between
physical capital and entrepreneurial labor. If any one of these three elements are
absent from the model, then workers su¤er a welfare loss from the technology change.
Two important caveats of our ndings are in order. First, our framework does not
allow us to say anything about changes in income inequality among agents in the lower
nine-tenths of the U.S. income distribution. This group encompasses individuals with
a wide range of skills and education levels. The empirical evidence shows that income
inequality within this broad group has also increased markedly over the past three
decades. A framework with more than two types of agents is needed to study the
consequences of such developments. Second, we abstracted from endogenous human
capital investment which could help spread the benets of skill-biased technological
change to agents who fall outside the top decile. Still, the inclusion of such features
would not eliminate the large fundamental uncertainty that surrounds the welfare
implications of rising income inequality. Overall, our ndings suggest that caution is
warranted when formulating potential policy responses to rising U.S. income equality.
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A Appendix: Model Solution
A.1 First-Order Conditions in Stationary Variables
Combining the agents labor supply equations (6) and (12) with the rms labor
demand equations (21) and (22) yields the following pair of nonlinear equations that
pin down the values of n `wt and `
c
t as functions of the two state variables kn;t 
kt= exp (zt) and t :
n `wt =
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where we have made use of Ht = exp(zt) and the expressions for the income share
variables sct and s
k
t given by equations (24) and (25). Recall that t and t are
functions of the state variable t; as given by equations (15) and (16).
To facilitate a numerical solution, the rms intertemporal rst-order condition
(23) can be rewritten in terms of stationary variables. Dividing both sides of equation
(23) by yt and dening the rms intertemporal decision variable as the investment-
output ratio xt  it=yt yields
xt = bEt  ct+1
ct
yt+1
yt

[skt+1 + (1  ) xt+1]; (A.3)
where we have substituted in M ct+1  ct+1=ct :
From the capital owners rst-order condition (9), we have
ct+1
ct
yt+1
yt
=
"
c ct+1=yt+1   D
c
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=yt+1
c ct =yt   D
c
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# 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1 
: (A.4)
The above equation can be further transformed by substituting in the following ex-
pressions that derive from the capital owners budget constraint (8), the capital
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owners labor supply equation (12), and the production function (13):
c ct =yt = s
c
t   xt    t; (A.5)
Dc
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(A.7)
where  t  Tt=yt is the lump-sum tax rate and we have made use of zt+1   zt = :
The tax rate is a function of the state variable t; as given by equation (26). The
stationary endogenous variables n `wt ; `
c
t ; s
c
t ; and s
k
t ; are governed by equations (A.1),
(A.2), (24) and (25), respectively.
The upshot of all this is that the rms intertemporal rst order condition (A.3)
can now be written as the following nonlinear stochastic di¤erence equation involving
only stationary variables:
xt
(
t
h
(1  t) k  kn;t + t (`ct) k
i  `
 k + (1  t) (n `wt ) `
) 1 
 `
h
 1
 s
c
t +
1
 s
k
t   xt    t
i =

0 bEt
(
t+1
h 
1  t+1

k
 k
n;t+1 + t+1
 
`ct+1
 ki  ` k + (1  t+1) (n `wt+1) `
) 1 
 `
h
 1
 s
c
t+1 +
1
 s
k
t+1   xt+1    t+1
i
(A.8)
where 
0   exp [(1  )] and we have collected variables dated t+ 1 on the right
side. The object to be forecasted involves three future decision variables xt+1; `ct+1;
and n `wt+1 and two future state variables kn;t+1 and t+1: Since the law of motion for
t+1 is exogenous, the only remaining element needed for a solution is the endogenous
law of motion for kn;t+1; which is derived next.
Starting from the denitional relationship kn;t+1  kt+1= exp (zt+1) ; we have
kn;t+1 = kn;t exp ( zt+1 + zt) kt+1
kt
;
= kn;t exp ( )B

it
yt
yt
kt

; (A.9)
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where we have substituted in the laws of motion for zt+1 and kt+1: From the produc-
tion function (13), we have
yt
kt
=
A
kn:t
(
t
h
(1  t) k  kn;t + t (`ct) k
i  `
 k + (1  t) (n `wt ) `
) 1
 `
: (A.10)
Substituting equation (A.10) into (A.9) together with xt  it=yt yields the fol-
lowing law of motion for the normalized capital stock:
kn;t+1 = A
B exp ( ) k1 n;t xt
(
t
h
(1  t) k  kn;t + t (`ct) k
i  `
 k + (1  t) (n `wt ) `
) 
 `
:
(A.11)
A.2 Perfect Foresight
Under perfect foresight, the transformed intertemporal rst-order condition (A.8)
becomes
f (xt; `
c
t ; n `
w
t ; kn;t; t) = h
 
xt+1; `
c
t+1; n `
w
t+1; kn;t+1; t+1

; (A.12)
where we have eliminated sct ; s
k
t ; s
c
t+1; s
k
t+1 using equations (24) and (25). The
decision variables n `wt and `
c
t must satisfy equations (A.1) and (A.2) each period.
Two approximate solutions of the model can be obtained by log-linearizing equa-
tions (A.1), (A.2), (A.8), and (A.11) around each of the two steady states corre-
sponding to t = 0 and t = 1: We use the t-weighted average from the two sets
of log-linear decision rules to construct an initial conjectured sequence of values for
the nonlinear function h() from t = 0 (the initial steady state) to t = 1500 (the nal
steady state). At each time t; the conjectured value for h(t+ 1) is substituted into
the right side of equation (A.12). Given h(t+ 1) equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.12)
can be solved simultaneously for xt; `ct ; and n `
w
t using a nonlinear equation solver.
The resulting values are used to compute kn;t+1 from equation (A.11) with t+1 given
by the exogenous law of motion (17). This procedure is repeated each time period,
yielding a new conjectured sequence for h() from t = 0 to t = 1500: The perfect
foresight solution is obtained when the conjectured sequence for h() does not change
(to an accuracy of 0.0001) from one simulation to the next. In practice, convergence
is obtained after about 70 simulations.
A.3 Myopic Expectations
Under myopic expectations, we assume bEt h (t+ 1) = h (t  1) : The transformed
intertemporal rst-order condition (A.8) becomes
f (xt; `
c
t ; n `
w
t ; kn;t; t) = h
 
xt 1; `ct 1; n `
w
t 1; kn;t 1; t 1

: (A.13)
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At each date t; equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.13) can be solved simultaneously
for xt; `ct ; and n `
w
t using a nonlinear equation solver. The resulting values are used
to compute kn;t+1 from equation (A.11) with t+1 computed using the exogenous law
of motion (17).
A.4 Learning
Under learning, we assume bEt h (t+ 1) = !t h (t+ 1)+ (1  !t) h (t  1) ; where !t =
t: The transformed intertemporal rst-order condition (A.8) becomes
f (xt; `
c
t ; n `
w
t ; kn;t; t) = t h
 
xt+1; `
c
t+1; n `
w
t+1; kn;t+1; t+1

+ (1  t) h
 
xt 1; `ct 1; n `
w
t 1; kn;t 1; t 1

:(A.14)
Similar to case of perfect foresight, the solution under learning requires an initial
conjectured sequence of values for the nonlinear function h() from t = 0 to t = 1500.
As before, we construct the initial conjectured sequence using a t-weighted average
of the two sets of decision rules from the log-linearized learning model. At each time
t; the conjectured value for h(t+ 1) and the realized lagged value h(t  1) are both
substituted into the right side of equation (A.14), thus allowing equations (A.1),
(A.2) and (A.14) to solved simultaneously for xt; `ct ; and n `
w
t : This procedure is
repeated each time period, yielding a new conjectured sequence for h() : The learning
solution is obtained when the conjectured sequence for h() does not change from one
simulation to the next.
B Appendix: Welfare Computation
An individual workers lifetime utility can be written as
V w =
1X
t=0
t
h
cwt   D
w
 Ht (`
w
t )

i1    1
1  
=
1X
t=0
t
h
 1
 c
w
t +
1
 Tt=n
i1    1
1   ; (B.1)
where we have substituted in DwHt (`wt )
 = wwt `
w
t from the labor supply equation
(6) and wwt `
w
t = c
w
t + Tt=n from the budget equation (3). Similarly, an individual
capital owners lifetime utility can be written as
V c =
1X
t=0
t
h
 1
 c
c
t +
1
 (dt   Tt)
i1    1
1   ; (B.2)
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where the terms in square brackets in (B.1) and (B.2) are the agents composite
consumption baskets. Both (B.1) and (B.2) show the direct inuence of transfers Tt
on lifetime utility.
The welfare e¤ect of the technology change is calculated as the constant percent-
age amount by which the agents composite consumption basket in the no-change
economy (which holds income shares constant at their initial levels) must be ad-
justed upward or downward each period to make lifetime utility equal to that in
the transition economy. Specically, we nd w and c that solve the following two
equations
1X
t=0
t
[C wt ]
1    1
1   =
1X
t=0
t

C
w
t (1 + 
w)
1    1
1   ; (B.3)
1X
t=0
t
[C ct ]
1    1
1   =
1X
t=0
t

C
c
t (1 + 
c)
1    1
1   ; (B.4)
where C wt and C
c
t are the composite consumption baskets in the transition economy
and C
w
t and C
c
t are the composite consumption baskets obtained along the no-change
trend. The innite sums in (B.3) and (B.4) are approximated by sums over a 1500
period simulation, after which the results are not changed. The initial conditions at
t = 0 correspond to the steady state with t = 0:
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